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Cogent justifi cations for con-tinuing subsidies to U.S. crop farmers are diffi cult to 
fi nd. Most analyses suggest that 
our farm programs lead to greater 
concentration, higher land prices 
and cash rents, increased produc-
tion of supported commodities, and 
lower market prices. And as we have 
pointed out in recent Iowa Ag Review 
articles, current subsidy programs 
provide a quite ineffi cient safety net: 
overcompensating producers in low 
price–high production years and 
undercompensating them in high 
price–low production years. In addi-
tion, farm subsidies go predominant-
ly to farm families that have higher 
wealth and income levels than the 
average U.S. family. And fi nally, there 
would be no major changes in aggre-
gate food production or food prices 
in the United States if subsidies were 
ended tomorrow.
Most supporters of farm sub-
sidies no longer attempt to justify 
them by appealing to any broad pub-
lic purpose. Rather, many now argue 
that it would be unfair to eliminate 
them. It would be unfair to those 
farmers who are counting on contin-
ued high land prices and cash rents 
for their retirement. It would be un-
fair to farmers who paid high prices 
for land in the expectation that sub-
sidies would continue to prop them 
up. It would be unfair to regions 
where production would decline 
dramatically if the subsidies were 
withdrawn. And fi nally, it would be 
unfair to U.S. farmers to have their 
subsidies taken away when farmers 
in other countries continue to enjoy 
production subsidies and protec-
Unfair Trade: Culprits and Victims
tion from international competition 
through high import tariffs.
An “unfair” playing fi eld in in-
ternational competition is now the 
most common justifi cation given for 
U.S. subsidies. A recent international 
example of an unfair trading practice 
is Argentina’s decision to tax wheat 
exports but not fl our exports. Not 
surprisingly, fl our exports increased 
signifi cantly. Millers in Chile suddenly 
found themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage because of this discrimi-
natory export tax. To level the playing 
fi eld, the Chilean government placed 
a countervailing duty on Argentina’s 
fl our exports. U.S. producer groups 
are quick to point out unfair trading 
practices. For example, the Ameri-
can Sugar Alliance argues that sugar 
import quotas are justifi able because 
otherwise U.S. consumers would be 
able to pay artifi cially low prices for 
their sugar. North Dakota wheat grow-
ers argue that they need subsidies to 
partially offset the damage they suffer 
from unfair Canadian wheat exports. 
And almost all agricultural groups 
argue that it would be foolish to “uni-
laterally disarm” until other countries 
agree to cut their subsidies. Given 
that the European Union has been 
the most egregious provider of do-
mestic subsidies, this last argument 
really amounts to: “let’s not cut ours 
until the E.U. cuts theirs.”
Who Faces Unfair Competition?
A recent study by my FAPRI col-
leagues at CARD and the University 
of Missouri helps provide insight into 
when the argument of unfair competi-
tion holds water. (See the article by 
John Beghin in this issue for details.) 
The study estimated what would 
happen to U.S. and world agriculture 
(grain and oilseeds, livestock, sugar, 
and cotton) if the recent U.S. WTO 
proposal were fully implemented. 
The United States proposed signifi -
cant cuts in both domestic subsi-
dies and tariffs for most products. 
Commodity prices under the U.S. 
proposal would be higher than the 
status quo because the decrease in 
production from protected farmers is 
greater than the production increase 
from competitive farmers. 
Regarding the fortunes of U.S. 
farmers under the proposal, we 
can measure the extent of damage 
from unfair competition by looking 
at the effects of the U.S. proposal 
on production and net exports 
(exports minus imports). Farmers 
who would respond to liberalization 
with increases in production and 
net exports are the farmers who are 
currently most damaged by for-
eign protectionism. Those farmers 
who would experience declines in 
production and net exports are the 
ones who are not justifi ed in argu-
ing for compensation because of un-
fair competition. This second set of 
farmers could be considered as pro-
viding unfair competition to foreign 
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producers. A third set of farmers are 
those producers who would pro-
duce just about the same amount 
under liberalization as they produce 
now. For this group the impetus to 
produce more from liberalization is 
about equal to existing production 
incentives of farm programs. This 
last group may be justifi ed in arguing 
for giving up their subsidies when 
others give up theirs.
The results of the FAPRI study 
indicate that U.S. livestock produc-
ers belong to the fi rst group of pro-
ducers. U.S. beef and pork exports 
would increase by about 25 per-
cent under the U.S. proposal, while 
broiler exports would increase by 
about 8 percent. Cattle and hog 
prices would increase by between 
4 and 5 percent while broiler prices 
would increase by approximately 2 
percent. The livestock results indi-
cate that E.U. production subsidies 
and high tariffs on meat imports 
around the world currently harm 
U.S. livestock producers. California 
rice producers also belong to this 
fi rst group because they would fi nd 
expanded demand for their product 
in Japan and South Korea. 
Milk producers and most grain 
and oilseed producers belong to the 
third set of producers who would 
fi nd that their production levels and 
net exports would largely be un-
changed under the U.S. proposal. For 
dairy, currently high E.U. support 
prices create surplus dairy products 
that have to be exported with subsi-
dies. Elimination of these surplus ex-
ports would signifi cantly raise world 
prices. This price increase would 
just about compensate U.S. dairy 
producers for cuts in the U.S. dairy 
program. For grains and oilseeds 
increased liberalization under the 
U.S. proposal has a small impact on 
demand. Thus U.S. dairy, grain, and 
oilseed producers could legitimately 
argue that they would be willing to 
give up their subsidies if the E.U. and 
other countries gave up theirs. 
Cotton and sugar producers 
belong to the second group of pro-
ducers because under the U.S. WTO 
proposal, production and net ex-
ports would decline. One can con-
clude from this study that for cotton 
and sugar, U.S. farm programs create 
an unfair playing fi eld for the rest of 
the world. For sugar, the situation is 
complicated because the net effect of 
trade barriers and subsidies around 
the world is a depression in world 
prices, which would seem to provide 
an argument in favor of continued 
U.S. support. However, it is clear that 
a move to lower production subsi-
dies and trade barriers would result 
in a sharp increase in U.S. sugar im-
ports and signifi cantly lower prices 
for U.S. sugar buyers.
Not All Our Competitors 
Are Subsidized
Enough examples of unfair trading 
practices and production subsidies 
exist around the world to give some 
credence to the common portrayal 
of U.S. farmers under siege from 
unfair competition. High Japanese 
import tariffs, large E.U. export 
subsidies, and seemingly endless 
E.U. production subsidies certainly 
exist and depress demand for U.S. 
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products. However, there are many 
examples of competing countries 
that provide very little support for 
their agricultural sectors, and some 
competitors are actually placed at 
a competitive disadvantage by their 
governments’ policies.
New Zealand and Chile are 
perhaps the two best examples of 
countries that have found agricul-
tural success without subsidies. 
Their consumers have easy access to 
imported food products so their pro-
ducers must compete with foreign 
producers for sales in their domestic 
markets, and export-oriented pro-
ducers must export at world prices. 
New Zealand farmers export dairy 
products, lamb, fruit, wine, and pro-
duce grains and vegetables for their 
domestic market. Chile is best known 
for exporting fruit and wine, but 
Chile is looking at export markets for 
pork, beef, and dairy products also. 
Brazil and Australia are two 
agricultural powerhouses that have 
thrived with minimal production sub-
sidies. According to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, government support ac-
counts for 3 percent of farm receipts 
in Brazil and for 4 percent in Austra-
lia. But farm groups often complain 
about the unfair competition from 
these two countries. For example, 
the American Sugar Alliance—the 
lobbying organization for the U.S. 
sugar industry—has complained 
about the $82 million in sugar subsi-
dies Australia provided in 2002.  But 
this amounts to less than 0.7¢ per 
pound of Australian sugar. Com-
plaints about Brazil range from infra-
structure investments, to currency 
devaluations, to subsidized credit. 
But infrastructure investments are 
a proper function of government, 
and Brazilian monetary policy is not 
determined by how it helps or hurts 
the agricultural sector. Credit subsi-
dies for purchasing machinery pro-
vide much less production stimulus 
than do U.S. loan rates.
Argentina provides a near-perfect 
example of a major agricultural com-
petitor that actually reduces the com-
petitiveness of its farmers through 
both offi cial and unoffi cial policy 
interventions. Besides the damage 
caused by Argentina’s macroeco-
nomic policies, offi cial Argentine 
agricultural policy levies a 20 percent 
tax on beef, dairy, soybean, and grain 
exports. The purpose of the tax is 
to raise revenue for the government 
and to help hold down food prices 
for Argentine consumers. The impact 
on agriculture is lower investment, 
productivity, production, exports, 
and farmer income. Unoffi cial policy 
in Argentina can be equally damag-
ing. Argentina is tied for 97th place 
on Transparency International’s 
global Corruption Perceptions Index 
(see http://www.transparency.org/               
policy_and_research/surveys_
indices/cpi/2005). This low ranking 
compares to 17th place for the Unit-
ed States, 21st place for Chile, and 
62nd place for Brazil. One example of 
Argentine corruption involves the re-
cent campaign to hold down infl ation 
by pressuring companies to reduce 
prices. Some food companies were 
told that their expansion plans were 
not going to be permitted unless they 
agreed to reduce their prices. In con-
trast to the positive attitude in Chile 
and Brazil about agriculture’s future, 
Argentine farmers and food com-
panies have a fatalistic view of the 
future. Despite enormous potential 
for productivity gains in Argentine 
agriculture, the attitude of the people 
who would have to do the hard work 
and investments to achieve the gains 
is that the government will never 
allow them to reap the profi ts from 
such endeavors.
Two Paths 
U.S. agriculture faces two possible 
future paths. One follows the direc-
tion laid out by the recent U.S. WTO 
proposal. This path would involve 
less direct government management 
of prices and production through 
guaranteed prices, a gradual ration-
alization of U.S. agriculture that 
would emphasize production of 
those products that U.S. farmers are 
relatively good at producing, and a 
gradual lowering of barriers to trade 
around the world. This path would 
require gradual investment adjust-
ment by processors, acreage adjust-
ment by farmers, and, depending 
on the willingness of Congress to 
support land prices, some fi nan-
cial adjustment by farmers in some 
regions. 
An alternative path is gaining 
momentum among some U.S. farm 
groups. This path would increase 
government control over the direc-
tion of U.S. agriculture. Export mar-
kets would not be seen as growth 
opportunities. Trade agreements 
would be de-emphasized or ig-
nored. Imports would be restricted. 
Prices would be set by a combina-
tion of paid land diversions, loan 
rates, and biofuels subsidies. At a 
recent Iowa Corn Growers Asso-
ciation crop fair, one corn grower, 
seemingly an advocate of this sec-
ond path, stated that expanded U.S. 
exports only damage the farmers 
in the importing countries, and im-
ports only damage U.S. producers; 
so why, he wondered, should we 
ever allow trade in food?
Given the current lack of sup-
port for trade liberalization in Con-
gress, and in key E.U. countries such 
as France, it is not clear that a new 
WTO agreement will be achieved. If 
not, U.S. farm programs will con-
tinue to be vulnerable to WTO cases 
under the current agreement. Advo-
cates of the second path for U.S. ag-
riculture could then fi nd themselves 
in a stronger position, arguing that 
the U.S. Congress should write farm 
policy, not the WTO. The large dif-
ference in direction represented 
by these two paths means that all 
of us with an interest in the future 
of U.S. agriculture should closely 
follow what happens in the next six 
months of WTO negotiations. ◆
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Agricultural Situation
Spotlight
When Is GRIP the Right Choice for Crop Insurance?
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The Risk Management Agency has greatly expanded avail-ability of Group Risk Income 
Protection (GRIP) for 2006. Covered 
crops now include corn, soybeans, 
grain sorghum, wheat, and cotton in 
most major production regions. Now 
that GRIP is widely available, many 
farmers and their crop insurance 
agents are considering whether GRIP 
could be the right crop insurance 
choice for 2006. As we will show, the 
answer varies by farm and produc-
tion region.
What Is GRIP and 
How Does It Work?
GRIP provides protection against 
unexpected declines in county rev-
enue. This contrasts with Revenue 
Assurance (RA) and Crop Revenue 
Coverage (CRC), which provide pro-
tection against declines in revenue 
at the farm level. Thus, a farmer who 
buys GRIP could suffer a loss and 
not receive an insurance payment. 
This would occur if his or her farm 
yield is low but the county yield is 
not. However, many farmers fi nd 
that their farm yield is rarely low 
unless the county yield is low. These 
are the farmers who are most likely 
to fi nd GRIP benefi cial.
First, a few program details and 
defi nitions will help in understand-
ing how GRIP works. GRIP pays an 
indemnity whenever actual county 
revenue falls below a trigger revenue 
level. Actual county revenue equals 
the product of the harvest price and 
the county average yield. The trigger 
revenue equals the product of se-
lected coverage level (90, 85, 80, 75, 
or 70 percent) and expected county 
revenue. Expected county revenue 
equals the product of expected 
county yield and expected price. 
Expected county yield is simply the 
trend yield for a county. The ex-
pected price is based on the futures 
price before sales closing date for 
crop insurance.
An often-confusing aspect of 
GRIP is that, unlike RA and CRC, the 
amount of insurance that a farmer 
buys is not equal to the trigger 
revenue. Rather, farmers select an 
amount of insurance between 90 
and 150 percent of expected county 
revenue. 
When actual county revenue 
falls below the trigger revenue, an 
indemnity is paid. The amount of 
the indemnity equals the product 
of the amount of insurance and the 
percent loss, where the percent loss 
is computed as the difference be-
tween the trigger revenue and the 
actual county revenue divided by 
the trigger revenue.
Finally, just as RA and CRC of-
fer farmers extra protection when 
the harvest price climbs above 
the expected price, so too does an 
optional endorsement to GRIP. The 
endorsement is called the Harvest 
Revenue Option (HRO). If a farmer 
selects this endorsement (and 
pays the addition premium), then if 
the actual harvest price is greater 
than the expected harvest price, 
the amount of protection and the 
trigger revenue are multiplied by 
the ratio of the actual price to the 
expected price.
Comparing GRIP 
to Other Products
To illustrate how GRIP is likely to 
perform in the future relative to RA 
and CRC, we calculated what GRIP 
would have cost and what it would 
have paid out from 1980 to 2004 
had it been available during that 
Figure 1. Net indemnities for 90 percent GRIP-HRO and 75 percent 
RA-HPO for Poweshiek County, Iowa, corn coverage, 1980-2004
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time. We assumed that the maximum 
amount of insurance was obtained 
with GRIP-HRO at the 90 percent cov-
erage level. For comparison, we also 
estimated what the cost and aver-
age payout for RA (with the harvest 
price option) and CRC would have 
been over the same period at the 75 
percent coverage level. These cover-
age levels were chosen to equalize 
the premium subsidy percentage 
among the insurance products.
Net indemnities (insurance pay-
out minus producer-paid premium) 
are shown in Figure 1 for corn in 
Poweshiek County, Iowa; Figure 2 for 
wheat in Barnes County, North Da-
kota; and Figure 3 for dryland cotton 
in Lubbock County, Texas. A positive 
number indicates that indemnities 
paid out exceed what the producer 
would have paid in premium. 
Figure 1 shows that GRIP-HRO 
pays out much more often and a 
higher amount than does RA in 
Poweshiek County. There are two 
reasons for this. The fi rst is that 
GRIP-HRO has a 90 percent trigger 
and RA has a 75 percent trigger, 
which means that a price drop like 
we saw in 2004 will more readily 
trigger a payout under GRIP than 
under RA. The second reason is that 
losses at the farm level are highly 
correlated with losses at the county 
level. This means that whenever 
there are signifi cant farm-level 
losses, there will also be signifi cant 
county-level losses. The techni-
cal terms describing this situation 
are that losses on corn in Iowa are 
primarily driven by systemic factors 
such as widespread drought or ex-
cess rainfall (factors affecting many 
farms in the area at the same time) 
and not by poolable factors such as 
wind, hail, or disease (factors affect-
ing only individual farms).
The results in Figure 2 and Fig-
ure 3 show that insurance losses 
on North Dakota wheat and Texas 
cotton are driven by both systemic 
and poolable factors. The years in 
which GRIP pays out a large amount 
are also the years when RA and 
Figure 2. Net indemnities for 90 percent GRIP-HRO and 75 percent 
RA-HPO for Barnes County, North Dakota, wheat coverage, 1980-2004
Figure 3. Net indemnities for 90 percent GRIP-HRO and 75 percent CRC 
for Lubbock County, Texas, non-irrigated cotton coverage, 1980-2004
CRC pay out a large amount, which 
shows that systemic risk is impor-
tant in both regions. But note the 
number of years in which RA or CRC 
pay out but GRIP does not. For both 
the wheat and cotton examples, we 
estimate that there would have been 
positive net average payouts for RA 
but negative net payouts for GRIP in 
6 out of the 25 years. This illustrates 
that for these crops, poolable risk is 
much more important than it is for 
Iowa corn. 
These illustrations show that 
whether GRIP is the right crop 
insurance choice for a farmer de-
pends in part on whether a farm-
er’s losses are driven primarily by 
poolable risk or systemic risk. One 
way to estimate the importance of 
the two is to graph a farm’s histori-
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In addition to our preliminary baseline for the 2006 U.S. and World Agricultural Outlook, this year 
economists with the Food and Ag-
ricultural Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI) also undertook an analysis 
of the proposal to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) submitted by 
the Offi ce of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative in October. The proposal was 
an effort to jumpstart negotiations 
leading up to WTO’s sixth ministerial 
conference in December. The Hong 
Kong conference brought 149 mem-
ber countries together to further 
negotiations on agricultural trade 
reform and other topics.
The U.S. WTO proposal includes 
changes in export competition, mar-
ket access, and domestic support. 
The FAPRI analysis covers the fi rst 
seven years of policy changes im-
plied by the proposal, during which 
the most signifi cant reductions in 
tariffs and trade-distorting domestic 
support and elimination of export 
subsidies would be phased in start-
ing in 2007/08. 
The U.S. proposal reduces the 
permitted current U.S. aggregate mea-
sures of support to $7.64 billion and 
limits so-called blue box support to 
$4.77 billion. These limits imply lower 
loan rates and support prices and re-
duced countercyclical payments. The 
proposal lowers domestic support in 
the European Union to €11.4 billion, 
implying large reductions in actual 
domestic support in sugar, dairy, 
cereals, fruits, and vegetables. The 
proposal includes signifi cant tariff 
reductions or tariff rate quota (TRQ) 
FAPRI Analyzes the U.S. Proposal to the WTO
expansions. These market access re-
forms would open the protected rice, 
sugar, and dairy markets. All export 
subsidies would be eliminated, which 
would mostly affect E.U. production 
and trade of sugar, rice, meat, and 
dairy products. 
Effects on Commodity Prices
The FAPRI analysis fi nds that these 
proposed reforms would moder-
ately increase world prices for most 
commodities, with larger increases 
for sugar, rice, and dairy. Dairy and 
livestock would be directly impacted, 
which in turn would affect feed sec-
tors. U.S. exports of pork, beef, and 
rice would greatly expand. Corn and 
wheat exports would grow moderate-
ly. U.S. cotton exports would decline.
FAPRI projects that in many 
cases, the increase in world prices 
and gains in world markets would 
not fully compensate for the removal 
of coupled domestic support in the 
United States and European Union. 
Decoupled payments could compen-
sate for the loss of farm income from 
coupled payments. They would not 
have to be as large because distor-
tions would be removed and world 
prices would be higher. Select results 
of the analysis for major world com-
modities are given on pages 7 and 8.
U.S. Proposal versus 
Hong Kong Declaration
The sixth WTO ministerial meeting 
ended with a declaration on Decem-
ber 18 that falls short of the U.S. 
proposal. It does not provide the 
so-called modalities necessary to 
implement the proposed reductions 
in tariffs and domestic support. 
Countries have tentatively agreed 
to eliminate all export subsidies by 
2013 (the U.S. proposal stipulated 
2010 as a deadline). Least-developed 
countries would have duty-free ac-
cess to developed country markets 
on at least 97 percent of tariff lines 
by 2008; yet that leaves 3 percent of 
lines potentially blocked for protect-
ed markets (for example, U.S. and 
E.U. sugar). Other tariff cuts will fall 
within four bands, with higher cuts 
in higher bands but with thresholds 
yet to be defi ned. 
Countries agreed to reduce 
trade-distorting domestic support 
using a three-tier system, with pro-
portional cuts in total support and 
aggregate measures of support de-
creasing by tier; the European Union 
would be in the top tier, Japan and 
the United States in the second tier, 
and everyone else in the lower tier. 
Cotton export subsidies of devel-
oped countries must be eliminated 
in 2006. The declaration states that 
other cotton subsidies “should be 
reduced more ambitiously” but does 
not provide modalities for achiev-
ing this. Special and differential 
treatment is still being negotiated. 
Therefore, it is hard to know if the 
eventual WTO agreement will have 
as much impact as the U.S. proposal 
would if it were implemented.
For more details, see “U.S. Pro-
posal for WTO Agriculture Negotia-
tions: Its Impact on U.S. and World 
Agriculture,” available at http://
www.fapri.iastate.edu/, and “Poten-
tial Impacts on U.S. Agriculture of 
the U.S. October 2005 WTO Pro-
posal,” available at http://www.fapri.
missouri.edu/. ◆
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Grains and Coarse Grains
Corn
U.S. corn exports and feed consumption both in-
crease, contributing to a modest increase in U.S. corn 
prices (less than 3 percent), driven by larger net im-
ports by the E.U. and South Korea. E.U. tariff reduc-
tions induce larger E.U. corn imports. Lower target 
prices and loan rates and a demand-driven increase 
in corn prices almost offset each other. U.S. corn use 
for ethanol and other industrial purposes falls, as do 
corn ending stocks. Higher U.S. corn prices contribute 
to an increase in prices for substitute feed grains. 
Wheat
U.S. wheat prices increase moderately (almost 3 per-
cent) because of increased export demand from Ja-
pan and China and reduced export supplies of Can-
ada, Russia, and Ukraine. Higher prices result in a 
slight increase in wheat production, limited by the 
increase in returns for feed grains. Food use and 
stocks decline slightly in response to higher prices. 
In E.U. wheat markets, the livestock sector decreas-
es feed use considerably, which leads to a fall in E.U. 
wheat prices.
Rice
World prices for long-grain rice increase by 8 percent. 
Medium-grain rice prices increase by 25 percent. 
These price increases are driven by greater market 
access in Japan and South Korea. Additional imports 
by Philippines, Indonesia, and the E.U. also increase 
long-grain rice trade. China, the U.S., Australia, and 
Egypt gain market shares in medium-grain rice trade. 
Long-grain rice exports increase for India, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Thailand, the U.S., and Vietnam.
Oilseeds and Products
In oilseed markets, changes are moderate. Higher 
prices for grain and reduced loan rates and target 
prices contribute to a slight reduction in U.S. soy-
bean production in most years and slightly higher 
prices (up 1 percent). Reduced livestock produc-
tion in Japan and the E.U. causes a reduction in U.S. 
soybean meal exports. This is offset by an increase 
in domestic soybean meal consumption driven by 
larger U.S. livestock production. The policy changes 
include tariff cuts for oilseeds and oilseed products 
in China, the E.U., India, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. The world price of soybean 
oil increases by 4 percent by 2014 following these 
tariff cuts. The elimination of differential export tax-
es in Argentina results in increased export demand 
for soybean products relative to soybeans, contrib-
U.S. Proposal to the WTO: Selected Results from the FAPRI Analysis
uting to improved crushing margins. Crush increases 
slightly, as improved crushing margins more than off-
set the effect of reduced soybean production. World 
consumption of all protein meal declines in tandem 
with animal production. 
Meat 
U.S. meat exports increase, driven by expanding Japa-
nese import demand following lower duties. Japan is 
historically a large consumer of U.S. beef and pork. 
The elimination of export subsidies and increased 
market access open E.U. meat markets. World prices 
of pork and beef products increase signifi cantly while 
poultry price changes are moderate. World trade of 
pork, beef, and poultry products increases by 7, 6, 
and 3 percent, respectively. The E.U. eliminates its 
beef export subsidy, which affects 76 percent of its to-
tal beef exports. These policy changes increase the 
E.U.’s net beef imports and depress its domestic beef 
price by 13 percent. In many importing countries, 
lower domestic prices resulting from tariff reduction 
are more than offset by higher world meat prices. Bra-
zil, Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. expand 
their exports. 
Dairy
Major dairy changes occur in the E.U., Canada, and Ja-
pan. Most other countries increase their dairy herds 
and milk production, but less fl uid milk is consumed 
as it is diverted into manufacturing use because world 
prices of dairy products increase. In the U.S., dairy 
production and milk prices increase. U.S. butter im-
ports increase, but cheese imports decline and nonfat 
dry (NFD) milk exports increase. Without an export 
subsidy and with reduced intervention prices, E.U. 
production and exports decrease substantially. Do-
mestic E.U. consumption increases because of lower 
domestic prices. The E.U. becomes a marginal play-
er in NFD and butter world markets. Australia, New 
Zealand, Argentina, Ukraine, and India partially com-
pensate for the decline in E.U. exports, which leads 
to higher world prices for butter, cheese, NFD, and 
whole milk powder (average increases of 34, 16, 7, 
and 18 percent, respectively). Canada becomes a net 
importer of NFD, as export subsidies disappear and 
tariffs are lowered. 
Sugar
U.S. sugar imports increase with the much larger TRQ, 
resulting in a 12 percent price decline for raw cane 
sugar. Domestic sugar production falls and consump-
tion increases. The E.U. would declare sugar as sensi-
tive, which would result in a larger TRQ and reduced 
?
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tariff. The world sugar price increases by 24 percent on 
average, driven by proposed E.U. sugar reforms. The 
E.U. imports over 4 million metric tons of sugar. Net 
exporting countries, such as Brazil, Australia, Colom-
bia, Argentina, and Cuba, would respond to the high-
er world price with increased sugar production, lower 
sugar consumption, and increased exports. 
Cotton
Cotton prices increase by about 2 percent in world 
markets. Given the modest foreign adjustments in the 
sector, the primary impact is through the reduction 
in domestic supports, which lowers U.S. production 
and exports. After the reduction in U.S. trade, the re-
sulting higher world prices push other exporters to 
ship out more while importers decrease their net de-
mand on world markets. There is an overall reduction 
in world trade. Larger exports out of Africa, Brazil, 
Pakistan, and Central Asia partially offset the lower 
U.S. cotton exports.
U.S. Net Farm Income
The reduction in U.S. target prices and loan rates reduc-
es crop returns to producers. For some crops, this effect 
is more than offset by higher prices. Between 2012/13 
and 2014/15 under this deterministic analysis, average 
returns, including all payments, increase for grains and 
most oilseeds but fall for cotton, peanuts, and sugar. 
Stochastic analysis led by FAPRI economists at the Uni-
versity of Missouri considers a range of possible market 
outcomes and yields slightly different average results. 
Considering a broader range of outcomes leads to cir-
cumstances in which the increase in prices may not be 
adequate to compensate producers for reduced loan 
program benefi ts and countercyclical payments, even 
for grain and oilseeds. ◆
Recent CARD Publications
Briefi ng Paper
How Much “Safety” Is Available under the 
U.S. Proposal to the WTO? Bruce A. 
Babcock and Chad E. Hart. October 2005. 
05-BP 48. 
Working Papers
Assessing Consumers’ Valuation of 
Cosmetically Damaged Apples Using 
a Mixed Probit Model. Chengyan Yue, 
Helen H. Jensen, Daren S. Mueller, Gail R. 
Nonnecke, and Mark L. Gleason. December 
2005. 05-WP 419.
Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic 
Disease, and Health Management Policy 
for Farmed Animals. David A. Hennessy.   
December 2005. 05-WP 418.
Biosecurity and Infectious Animal Disease. 
David A. Hennessy. November 2005. 05-
WP 413.
 
Business Organization and Coordination in 
Marketing Specialty Hogs: A Comparative 
Analysis of Two Firms from Iowa. Brent 
Hueth, Maro Ibarburu, and James 
Kliebenstein. November 2005. 05-WP 415.
EU Enlargement and Technology Transfer 
to New Member States. Simla Tokgoz. 
November 2005. 05-WP 414.
Inspection Intensity and Market Structure. 
Stéphan Marette. October 2005. 05-WP 412.
Managing Quality under Heterogeneous 
Consumer Demand and Product Quality. 
Miguel Carriquiry and Bruce A. Babcock. 
October 2005. 05-WP 410. 
 On the Segregation of Genetically Modifi ed, 
Conventional, and Organic Products in 
European Agriculture: A Multi-market 
Equilibrium Analysis. GianCarlo Moschini, 
Harun Bulut, and Luigi Cembalo. October 
2005. 05-WP 411.
The Regulatory Choice between a Label and 
a Minimum-Quality Standard. Stéphan 
Marette. December 2005. 05-WP 416.
Tariff Equivalent of Technical Barriers to 
Trade with Imperfect Substitution and 
Trade Costs. ChengyanYue, John C. Beghin, 
and Helen H. Jensen. November 2005. 05-
WP 383 (Revised).  
U.S. Proposal for WTO Agriculture 
Negotiations: Its Impact on U.S. and World 
Agriculture. FAPRI Staff. December 2005. 
05-WP 417.
WINTER 2006            CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT      9 
Iowa Ag Review
cal yield against the county average 
yield. If the scatter plot forms close 
to a straight line with a positive 
slope, then farm yields and county 
yields are highly correlated and GRIP 
may provide good risk management 
benefi ts. If the scatter plot is widely 
variable with no real discernable pat-
tern, then poolable risk is important 
and the farmer ought to think twice 
before buying GRIP.
Besides the risk management 
benefi ts, crop insurance products 
can boost average farm incomes 
because of the premium subsidies. 
Farmers pay only 45 percent of the 
total premium if they buy RA or CRC 
at the 75 percent coverage level or 
GRIP at the 90 percent coverage 
level. The Risk Management Agency 
tries to set the total premium at 
a level that would generate suffi -
cient premiums to just cover losses 
over the long term. That is, they 
hope that if many farmers buy their 
products over many years, then the 
indemnities paid out would about 
equal the total premium. In other 
words, the total premium is sup-
posed to represent an actuarially 
fair premium.
If premiums are actuarially fair, 
then farmers who buy RA or CRC at 
the 75 percent coverage level or GRIP 
at the 90 percent coverage level 
should receive $100 in indemnity for 
every $45 they pay in premium, for a 
net return of $55. That is, the expect-
ed rate of return from investments in 
farmer-paid premiums should be 122 
percent (1.22 = .55/.45) if premiums 
are actuarially fair.
Table 1 reports the historical 
rates of return for the products and 
time periods illustrated in Figures 1, 
2, and 3. The average rate of return 
for GRIP over this period across 
the three examples equals 123 
percent. Given the way that GRIP 
premium rates were developed, all 
three crops would have generated 
approximately 122 percent rates of 
return if the historical period had 
been extended back to 1957.
The rates of return to RA and 
CRC are all positive, indicating that 
farmers should expect to receive 
more in indemnities than they pay 
in premiums. But they are also all 
less than 122 percent, which could 
indicate premium rates that are 
in excess of actuarially fair levels. 
Furthermore, the expected returns 
(net indemnities) to GRIP are sub-
stantially greater than for RA and 
CRC. This refl ects both the higher 
expected rate of return and (for 
corn and wheat) the higher liability 
and premium per acre. Poweshiek 
County corn producers would have 
received $17/acre more in net in-
When Is GRIP the Right Choice 
Continued from page 5
demnities for GRIP than for RA over 
the historical period. 
Recommendations
The large rates of return for GRIP are 
to be expected because of the large 
premium subsidies. Putting the GRIP 
decision into gambling terms, farm-
ers get to bet $55 of house money 
for every $45 they bring to the table. 
With those odds, it is no wonder that 
GRIP pays out in the long run.
But crop insurance is more than 
a gamble: it also keeps farmers in 
business. The real danger in us-
ing GRIP for crop insurance is that 
even with good odds, catastrophes 
do happen. A hailstorm or localized 
fl ooding can destroy a farmer’s crop 
when the county has a bumper crop. 
Or a regional drought can devastate 
a farmer who operates at the edge of 
a county, while leaving farms in the 
rest of the county untouched. From a 
risk management perspective, GRIP 
is ideally suited for farmers who are 
well diversifi ed geographically in a 
county. For these farmers, GRIP can 
provide both a high rate of return on 
premium dollars as well as effi cient 
risk management benefi ts. ◆
Note of disclosure: Bruce Babcock 
helped develop GRIP,  GRIP-HRO, and 
RA as a private consultant. He has 
no current fi nancial interest in any of 
these products. 
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High Yields, Low Prices, and High 
Government Payments
Chad E. Hart
chart@iastate.edu
515-294-9911
The 2004 and 2005 crop years have set the high-water marks for national net farm 
income. In 2004, U.S. net farm 
income rose to $82.5 billion. And 
were it not for 2004, 2005 would 
have set a record for national net 
farm income at $71.5 billion. Even 
if we remove government support 
from the net farm income calcula-
tion, the 2004 and 2005 farm in-
come levels are the highest ever re-
corded. In fact, since 2002, the U.S. 
agricultural economy has been on 
a tear, with net farm income, cash 
receipts, and values of production 
all being much stronger than we 
have seen historically. However, at 
the same time, government sup-
port to agriculture has also in-
creased to near record levels. As 
Figure 1 shows, if USDA projections 
for 2005 hold, government support 
for agriculture will be $22.7 billion 
in 2005, which would be slightly be-
low the record of $22.9 billion set 
in 2000. While the value of agricul-
tural production has risen signifi -
cantly over the last several years, 
the value of government farm pay-
ments has maintained a high level.
In Iowa, these trends are just as 
pronounced. Iowa net farm income 
and value of agricultural production 
have been very strong over the past 
few years. For example, the value 
of Iowa’s corn crop has exceeded 
$3.7 billion in each of the last four 
years. However, in 2004 and 2005, 
Iowa corn received sizable govern-
ment support. Figure 2 shows the 
ratio of government support to the 
value of production for Iowa corn 
from 2002 through 2005. In 2002 and 
2003, this ratio was below 10 per-
cent, implying that over 90 percent 
Figure 1. U.S. value of agricultural production and direct 
government payments
Figure 2. Ratio of government support to value of production 
for Iowa corn
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of the total value of Iowa’s corn crop 
was derived from the market and less 
than 10 percent of the value was due 
to government support. By 2004, this 
ratio jumped to 33 percent. For the 
2005 crop year, projections indicate 
government payments to Iowa corn 
will equal half the market value of 
the crop. The trigger for the jump in 
support is in the lower corn prices 
Iowa and the rest of the nation have 
experienced lately.
Two of the largest government 
programs for agriculture, the market-
Figure 4. Composition of total value of Iowa corn for the 2004 crop year
Figure 3. Composition of total value of Iowa corn for the 2002 crop year
ing loan and countercyclical payment 
programs, provide payments when 
prices are low, regardless of market 
value or revenue from the crop. The 
2002 and 2004 crop years highlight 
how crop prices, values, and govern-
ment payments can interact. Figures 
3 and 4 show the composition of the 
total value of Iowa’s corn crop in 2002 
and 2004, respectively. The market 
value of the corn crop is roughly the 
same in both years, but because of 
the government payments, the total 
value of the 2004 corn crop is nearly 
$1 billion higher than that of the 
2002 crop. The lower prices for the 
2004 crop triggered over $400 mil-
lion in payments from the coun-
tercyclical payment program and 
$500 million from the marketing 
loan program. Almost no payments 
fl owed from these programs for the 
2002 crop. Programs that trigger on 
price can often pay when market 
revenues are at or above average; 
the 2004 and 2005 Iowa corn crops 
are examples of this. ◆
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According to recent estimates, society bears nearly $6.9 bil-lion per year in costs related 
to human illness caused by food-
borne pathogens. The numbers of 
deaths and illnesses, and the high 
costs of these illnesses, suggest 
that public and private efforts are 
needed to improve our response to 
the problem. However, because the 
occurrence of foodborne illness is 
infl uenced by the complex interac-
tion of many natural phenomena 
and human behaviors, it is not sole-
ly a scientifi c, regulatory, or human 
behavior problem. The perspectives 
of diverse disciplines taken together 
can better view the problem across 
the spectrum of the food system and 
fi nd cost-effective solutions. 
Building a Framework
CARD led a collaboration of other 
university and institutional partners 
in the Food Safety Research Con-
sortium to develop a conceptual 
framework to guide modeling and 
data collection efforts to improve 
food safety. The fundamental idea is 
that decisionmakers in public and 
private settings can improve how 
they set food safety priorities and al-
locate resources if they have quanti-
tative risk rankings and can con-
sider the availability, effectiveness, 
and cost of interventions to address 
these risks. 
Determining the best use of food 
safety resources is a diffi cult task 
faced by public policymakers, regu-
latory agencies, state and local food 
safety and health agencies, as well 
as private fi rms. To be most useful, 
a structure for priority setting and 
resource allocation for food safety 
must take full account of the food 
system’s complexity and available 
data but at the same time be simple 
enough to be workable and of prac-
tical value to decisionmakers. Work-
shops in Iowa, Georgia, and Massa-
chusetts and a national conference 
in Washington, D.C., included fed-
eral, state, and local public health 
and other agency representatives, 
commodity organizations, food and 
processing industry representa-
tives, consumer representatives, 
and university researchers.
Two Types of Priority Setting
The project team identifi ed two 
types of priority-setting decisions. 
Purpose 1 priority setting guides 
risk-based allocation of food safety 
resources, primarily by govern-
ment food safety agencies, across 
a wide range of interventions and 
other opportunities to reduce the 
public health impact of foodborne 
illness. Purpose 2 priority setting 
guides the choice of risk manage-
ment actions and strategies with 
respect to particular hazards and 
commodities. 
Purpose 1 priority setting helps 
policymakers identify the risks in 
the food supply and the points on 
the farm-to-table continuum that 
should be targeted for reducing 
these risks but does not reveal the 
most effective risk management ac-
tions or strategies. Purpose 1 can 
thus be described as broad resource 
allocation. Purpose 2 priority setting 
involves more data-intensive analy-
sis aimed at quantifying and com-
paring, where possible, the relative 
effectiveness of alternative risk man-
agement actions and strategies, so 
it can be described as targeted risk 
management. Case studies may be 
particularly useful for this purpose.
Typically, regulatory agencies 
look at Purpose 1 within their own 
jurisdictions or, in the case of the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
and other crosscutting agencies, 
across the entire food system. 
Purpose 2 risk management strate-
gies typically focus on particular 
hazardous agents or categories of 
hazards such as specifi c agent-food 
combinations (for example, E. coli 
O157:H7 in ground beef), a grouping 
of foods associated with a particu-
lar pathogen or other agent (for 
example, Listeria monocytogenes in 
meat, dairy, and other commodi-
ties), or all agents associated with 
a particular food or food category 
(for example, the safety of broiler 
chickens as affected by Salmonella, 
Campylobacter and other patho-
gens, or the safety of produce as 
affected by all microbial and chemi-
cal hazards). 
Purpose 2 analysis is likely to 
be signifi cantly more data-intensive 
than is Purpose 1, both because it 
can be and because it often needs 
to be, especially if it is intended to 
result in government regulatory 
action or spending decisions by 
private entities. In these situations, 
decisionmakers may seek more de-
tailed and case-specifi c information 
about the effectiveness and cost 
of proposed actions to justify their 
decisions. 
Harnessing Information for More Effective Use of 
Food Safety Resources
The perspectives of 
diverse disciplines taken 
together can better view 
the problem across the 
spectrum of the food 
system and fi nd 
cost-effective solutions. 
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Building Blocks of the Framework
It is essential that the framework 
be grounded in a multi-disciplin-
ary approach—including in the 
integration of data. It must also be 
practical, fl exible, and dynamic by 
including ongoing evaluation and 
continuous updating of risk rank-
ings and other elements. Four ana-
lytical elements are included in the 
framework structure: risk ranking, 
intervention assessment, health 
impact estimation, and combined 
evaluation. These elements apply 
to both Purpose 1 and Purpose 2 
priority setting, albeit to widely 
varying degrees. 
Risk ranking efforts order the 
relative public health impact of the 
food safety risk in terms of known 
human health outcomes. Interven-
tion assessment identifi es potential 
risk reduction interventions and, 
when available data permit, consid-
ers their feasibility, effectiveness, 
and cost. Health impact estimation 
is used to compute, as permitted 
by available data, the public health 
effectiveness and benefi ts of spe-
cifi c interventions and intervention 
strategies. Finally, the combined 
evaluation integrates all the data—
from the risk ranking, intervention 
assessment, and health impact esti-
mation—to help inform the deci-
sion-making process in food safety. 
Each analytical element has its 
unique challenges in terms of meth-
ods and available data, and prior-
ity setting for food safety cannot 
be reduced to a formula for either 
purpose. Determining the resource 
allocations or risk management 
strategies that are best for public 
health will always require judgment 
calls on a wide range of values and 
factors—political, policy, legal, or 
scientifi c—that are not amenable to 
quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, 
basic comparisons can be made on 
the available scientifi c information. 
The framework is only the start-
ing point. The next step is the devel-
opment of specifi c analytical tools 
and data systems to implement the 
framework and thus help achieve 
the ultimate goals of better resource 
allocation and risk management and 
a reduced public health burden of 
foodborne illness. 
Background materials are avail-
able on the project Web site: http://
www.card.iastate.edu/food_safety/. ◆ 
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